Explaining political choice: prospects for economic theory

Authors: S. Slukhai, Dr Hab., Prof., ORCID ID 0000-0002-2441-8001, Taras Shevchenko National University of Kyiv, Kyiv, Ukraine

Annotation: The goal of the article is to demonstrate the potential of the economic theory in political choice as opposed to market choice. The article analyzes the input of economic theory to analyzing political choice. The following research objectives were set: (a) to highlight the development of the modern economic theory with regard to political choice with special semphasis on studies dealing with transition nations; (b) to demonstrate relevance or irrelevance of economic voting concept under conditions of modern Ukraine; (c) to find out how the information imperfectness and its comprehension by consumers in the political market affect the resulting choice. The scope of this study extends to an individual’s choice within the political market, and a subject is its distinctiveness under conditions of transition society. It is shown that political choice is characterized by inherent irrationality that gives space to different ways of external influencing voter preferences. The author proves that the economic vote is not present in the Ukrainian political context.

Keywords: economic vote; imperfect information; political choice; rational ignorance; theory of public choice.

Received: 11/01/2021
1st Revision: 22/01/2021
Accepted: 19/02/2021

DOI: https://doi.org/10.17721/1728-2667.2021/214-1/4


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